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TRUTH, DEMOCRACY, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 
DANIEL P. TOKAJI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bullshit is deadly to democracy. Here and throughout, I use the term 
“bullshit” in the sense of Professor Harry Frankfurt’s short book on the subject.1 
The defining characteristic of bullshit is indifference to the truth.2 This is distinct 
from lying. Liars know the truth and deceive others about it. Bullshitters, by 
contrast, do not care whether what they say is true or false. They are driven by 
motives other than deception.3  
Bullshit is deadly to democracy, even deadlier than lies, because democracy 
depends on a shared commitment to the truth. We sometimes disagree on what 
is true, just as we disagree on what laws should govern us and how those laws 
should be interpreted. We may even, at times, try to mislead other people about 
what is true. But democracy cannot function without a common belief in truth.4 
This is why, for many of us, President Donald J. Trump arouses consternation 
about the future of democracy in America. His main interest is neither in 
conveying nor concealing the truth. When President Trump makes false 
statements—as he so persistently does5—it is usually for other reasons.6 In 
Professor Frankfurt’s words, not written about Trump but fitting him perfectly: 
 
* Associate Dean for Faculty, Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of 
Constitutional Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. This essay is dedicated to 
my late colleague Chris Fairman, for both his commitment to speaking the truth and his resistance 
to the prohibition of taboo words. See CHRISTOPHER J. FAIRMAN, FUCK: WORD TABOO AND 
PROTECTING OUR FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES (2009). 
 1. HARRY FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 5 (2005). Thanks to my colleague Dale Oesterle for 
sharing this book with me. 
 2. Id. at 61. 
 3. Id. at 55. 
 4. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, ON TYRANNY: TWENTY LESSONS FROM THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 65-71 (2017). 
 5. Glenn Kessler et al., President Trump Has Made 15,413 False or Misleading Claims Over 
1,055 days, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/20 
19/12/16/president-trump-has-made-false-or-misleading-claims-over-days/ [https://perma.cc/3H 
KF-SDYR]. 
 6. Matthew Yglesias, The Bullshitter-in-Chief, VOX (May 30, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/30/15631710/trump-bullshit [https://perma.cc/4 
CRG-L5RF]. 
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“What he cares about is what other people think of him.”7 Bullshitting is the 
greater enemy of truth than lying, because it represents an abandonment of the 
commitment to truth.8 And without this commitment, democracy cannot 
function.9 
Although Professor Hasen’s Childress Lecture does not use the term, there 
is no doubt that he shares my view that bullshit is poisonous to democracy.10 
What he calls the “post-truth” era is defined by its disregard for truth among 
many people, including not just the President but other politicians, purveyors of 
information, and the polity. The goal is typically not (or not just) to deceive their 
intended audience about what the truth is. Rather, they are driven by other 
objectives—to influence elections, to get more clicks and likes, to make money, 
or even to destabilize established democracies11—and commonly indifferent to 
what is or isn’t true.  
That is bullshit. And it is especially toxic bullshit, given the ease with which 
social media and other contemporary technologies can be used to disseminate 
misinformation without the filters of bygone days,12 like local newspapers13 and 
Walter Cronkite.14 As Professor Hasen has elsewhere described, the lower 
barriers to mass publication enable the propagation of false statements, even as 
the disappearance of trusted intermediaries makes it more difficult to check 
 
 7. FRANKFURT, supra note 1, at 18.  As my colleague Ruth Colker has recently noted, 
President Trump frequently accompanies false statements with insults, designed to denigrate his 
political opponents and thereby promote his own ambitions. Ruth Colker, The Power of Insults, 
100 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2020). 
 8. Id. at 61. 
 9. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 197 (2018). 
 10. Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a 
“Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J., 535, 536–37 (2020). 
 11. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy: How Vladimir 
Putin is Making the World Safe for Autocracy, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/russia-liberal-democracy/510011/ [https://perma.cc/89 
VF-B32Y]; Andrew Higgins, Putin’s Russia, Punching Above Its Weight, Keeps Adversaries Off 
Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/23/world/europe/russia-
putin.html [https://perma.cc/6FZZ-H79W]; International Republican Institute, Chinese Malign 
Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy, 6 (2019), https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/ 
chinese_malign_influence_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/58NK-4TDC]; Josh Rogin, China’s Efforts 
to Undermine Democracy are Expanding Worldwide, WASH. POST (June 27, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/27/chinas-efforts-undermine-democracy-are-
expanding-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/CAN8-6375]. 
 12. Hasen, supra note 10, at 542. 
 13. Lara Takenaga, More Than 1 in 5 U.S. Papers Has Closed. This Is the Result, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/21/reader-center/local-news-deserts.html 
[https://perma.cc/QJP8-UEAW]. 
 14. David Folkenflik, Walter Cronkite, America’s ‘Most Trusted Man,’ Dead, NPR (Jul. 18, 
2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106770499 [https://perma.cc/Q9S7 
-BN4Q]. 
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misinformation.15 Sunlight cannot disinfect, if we cannot or will not distinguish 
truth from falsity.  
Professor Hasen thus paints a dark portrait of American democracy. And it 
is hard to deny that things look bleak at the moment, not just in the U.S. but 
around the world. These are perilous times. Many countries are experiencing a 
loss of faith in constitutional democracy and the institutions that sustain it.16 This 
has contributed to the rise of extremist political movements, often with a racist, 
nativist, or authoritarian complexion. These developments threaten not only 
emerging democracies, but also established ones in Western Europe and North 
America. When societies become so polarized that there is scant common 
ground and no evident basis for compromise, when partisan divisions become 
so bilious that political adversaries are viewed as enemies, when racial, ethnic, 
and religious cleavages widen to the point that some feel like perpetual outsiders, 
and when we give up on truth, then democracy is at risk of perishing from the 
earth.  
The central question Professor Hasen asks is what election law can do about 
this state of affairs. He presents several suggestions, all of which I agree with, 
so won’t spend much time restating or explicating. Instead, I focus on the bigger 
question of what law can do in a hyperpolarized environment where we disagree 
not only about what is and what should be, but about the basic proposition that 
truth matters. As is common in responsive essays like this one, I will focus on 
the few points on which Professor Hasen and I diverge, at the risk of diverting 
attention from the many others on which we agree.  
Part II addresses Professor Hasen’s proposed modifications to election law, 
most of which are designed to help we the people distinguish truth from falsity. 
Though I agree with most of his recommendations and add one more, focused 
on foreign government interference with U.S. elections, I doubt that such rule-
tinkering will have a major impact. Instead, I recommend shoring up the 
institutions with responsibility over elections. That includes courts. Despite the 
polarization of the judiciary that Professor Hasen rightly notes, a cardinal 
principal of our legal system is that judicial factfinding is based on evidence. 
While we cannot expect courts to prevent the onslaught of lies and bullshit, they 
can—and at this point still do—embody our shared commitment to truth.  
Part III turns to free speech law, explaining how existing doctrine falls short 
of the First Amendment’s aspirations of promoting truth and democracy. The 
Supreme Court has long presumed that lower governmental barriers to speech 
 
 15. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 200, 201-02 (2018). 
 16. See, e.g., Roberto S. Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Signs of Deconsolidation, 28 J. 
DEMOCRACY 5, 5 (2017); Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 761, 769-70 
(2018); Public Trust in Government Remains Near Historic Lows as Partisan Attitudes Shift, PEW 
RES. CTR. (May 3, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/05/03/public-trust-in-government-re 
mains-near-historic-lows-as-partisan-attitudes-shi [https://perma.cc/6GH4-EYYT]. 
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advance the pursuit of truth and promote self-government. It hasn’t quite worked 
out that way in the digital age. Although we should be cautious about upending 
established rules that have generally served American democracy well over the 
last century, the libertarian approach to free speech does not necessarily promote 
truth or democracy.  
My main disagreement with Professor Hasen appears in Part IV. I urge that 
we avoid talking about a “‘post-truth’ world.” It’s not a thing. The world is no 
more “post-truth” after the 2016 election than it was “post racial” after the 2008 
election. Drawing on two short books by distinguished scholars outside of law—
philosopher Frankfurt’s On Bullshit and historian Timothy Snyder’s On 
Tyranny—I argue that this myth unintentionally emboldens those who would 
exploit skepticism about truth to weaken constitutional democracy. As lawyers 
and scholars, our greatest potential contribution is to practice and demand the 
fidelity to truth upon which democracy depends.  
II.  ELECTION LAW CAN ONLY DO SO MUCH, BUT IT CAN DO SOMETHING 
While dissenting from Professor Hasen’s “post-truth” terminology, I mostly 
accept his diagnosis of the problem and prescriptions for election law. If 
anything, I think the indifference to truth in current political discourse is worse 
than he portrays it. While election law cannot alone solve these problems, it can 
make things better, primarily through the improvement of electoral institutions.  
A. Election Law Reform 
Professor Hasen correctly notes that there is “fundamental disagreement 
among members of the public regarding basic facts about the state of the 
world.”17 This disagreement is driven in part by the rise of social media and 
concomitant decline in “trusted intermediaries, especially the news media, who 
had helped people to separate the truth from fiction.”18 The difficulty in 
distinguishing truth from fiction has led some people to discount—or even 
despair of discovering—the truth.19 He cites the danger that “people will 
discount the veracity of all information based on the potential for it to be false.”20 
This is an especially deadly prospect. It is one thing to be mistaken about what 
is true; it is far worse if the citizenry no longer believes it possible to discover 
the truth.21 When bullshit has become so pervasive that we give up hope for 
truth, the foundations of democracy are imperiled.  
 
 17. Hasen, supra note 10, at 537. 
 18. Id. at 539. 
 19. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 9, at 198-99 (discussing loss of faith in truth and 
consequent deleterious effects on democracy). 
 20. Hasen, supra note 10, at 543. 
 21. SNYDER, supra note 4, at 65 (“If nothing is true, then no one can criticize power, because 
there is no basis on which to do so.”). 
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Professor Hasen recommends several changes to existing election laws to 
make it harder to deceive would-be voters and easier for them to discover 
whether the information they’re consuming is true or false. Below are his four 
main recommendations, with my comments: 
1. Prohibit false election speech. The First Amendment has long been 
understood to limit public entities’ authority to restrict speech because of its truth 
or falsity, part of the larger prohibition on content-based discrimination that is a 
staple of free speech law.22 An example is United States v. Alvarez, in which the 
Supreme Court struck down a federal law that penalized people for lying about 
military honors.23 The Court took a hard line on government attempts to 
criminalize false speech, declining to create a new categorical exception to the 
prohibition on content discrimination.  
That said, there is still room to regulate false speech. As Professor Hasen 
notes, false speech within polling places can be prohibited, because they are a 
“nonpublic forum” under the First Amendment.24 Viewpoint discrimination is 
prohibited within such a forum, but other forms of content discrimination—like 
a prohibition on false speech or campaign materials25—would not be, if drawn 
with sufficient clarity.26 Moreover, under New York Times v. Sullivan and its 
progeny, the government can prohibit defamation of public officials and public 
figures, if it satisfies the actual malice standard.27 That requires speech to be 
made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not.”28 
Speech made with knowledge of its falsity is a lie; speech made with 
“reckless disregard” of its falsity is bullshit, under Professor Frankfurt’s 
definition. Thus, a civil or criminal defamation law could be applied to 
knowingly or recklessly false campaign speech that injures the reputation of its 
 
 22. Part III delves into the general prohibition on content discrimination. 
 23. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713, 730 (2012); discussed in Hasen, supra note 
10, at 547. 
 24. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885–86 (2018); Hasen, supra 
note 10, at 548. While striking down the law before it on vagueness grounds, the Court stated in a 
footnote “We do not doubt that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about 
voting requirements and procedures.” Id. at 1889 n.4. For discussion of this statement, see William 
Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Deceptive Practices Act (Abstract Jan. 10, 2020). 
 25. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, 208, 211 (1992) (upholding prohibition on 
campaign-related speech). 
 26. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1888-91 (striking down ban on “political” speech as too vague 
and open ended). 
 27. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (extending this standard to criminal libel cases); Curtis v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130, 155 (1967) (extending standard to public figures). 
 28. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
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target.29 It’s also possible that a defamation law specifically targeting campaign 
ads would be upheld, although this would potentially run up against the First 
Amendment’s limits on content discrimination within a category of generally 
proscribable speech.30 Outside the realms of defamation and the polling place, 
bans on false campaign speech would have to meet strict scrutiny. But strict in 
theory is not fatal in fact.31 The evidence cited by Professor Hasen suggests that 
the systemic negative effects of pervasively false speech on democracy are a 
compelling interest that could justify a narrowly tailored law prohibiting false 
electoral speech.  
2. Truthful government speech. Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California famously declared that the remedy for false speech is 
“more speech, not enforced silence.”32 To be sure, this proposition has its limits, 
especially in an age where false speech is so easy to disseminate and so difficult 
to rebut effectively. But as Professor Hasen notes,33 public entities themselves 
have some power to respond to lies and bullshit, by engaging in government 
speech. In recent years, the Supreme Court has expanded the government speech 
doctrine, understanding it to reach religious monuments in public parks34 and 
specialty license plates.35 Governments could therefore establish agencies 
whose mission is to call out false campaign speech and publicize the truth. 
Whether such agencies would have much impact is another matter, but they 
would be squarely within the scope of what the First Amendment permits.  
3. Truth in labelling. Another recommendation of Professor Hasen is to 
compel disclosure of false speech. This might include a law requiring social 
media platforms to label “deep fakes” and other false or deceptive speech as 
“altered.”36 As he notes, the Supreme Court has generally been sympathetic to 
compelled disclosure that it perceives to be neutral, even as it has limited other 
government efforts to restrict speech.37 It has, for example, upheld 
governmentally compelled disclosure of information on such diverse topics as 
 
 29. See William Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 285, 291-92 (2004). 
 30. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-86 (1992). 
 31. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). The phrase “‘strict’ in 
theory and fatal in fact” comes from Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: 
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But empirical analysis shows it isn’t always so. Adam Winkler, Fatal 
in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006). 
 32. Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 33. Hasen, supra note 10, at 549. 
 34. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009). 
 35. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015). 
 36. Hasen, supra note 10, at 549. 
 37. Id. at 550–51. 
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abortions,38 campaign expenditures,39 and referendum petitions.40 On the other 
hand, the Court’s recent opinion in National Institute for Family and Life 
Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA)41 struck down disclosure requirements for so-
called “crisis pregnancy centers” that oppose abortion. In a split decision, the 
five more conservative justices found this to be a content-based restriction on 
speech that was inadequately tailored to the state’s claimed informational 
interest.42  
Professor Hasen is right to worry that NIFLA may signal a less tolerant 
approach to governmentally compelled disclosure on the part of the Court. But 
there is no bar to social media companies choosing to label speech on their own 
platforms as altered, manipulated, or even false. As he notes, these companies 
are private actors, not state actors, and therefore are not bound by the First 
Amendment.43 Whether social media companies are doing a good job of policing 
false and misleading speech on their platforms—and whether they are even 
capable of doing so effectively—is more questionable.44 Bullshit detection is a 
difficult challenge in any context, but especially so in the contemporary social 
media environment.  
4. Campaign finance disclosure. Professor Hasen proposes that campaign 
finance disclosure requirements be tightened, so as to better inform the public of 
the identity of those funding communications. He is certainly right that current 
laws aren’t up to the task of revealing “the true sources of new social media 
campaigns aimed at trying to influence opinions in elections.”45 His 
recommended fixes to campaign finance disclosure include (a) extending 
existing rules to online ads (including those on social media), (b) requiring 
disclosure of the “ultimate” source of funding for social media campaigns, (c) 
requiring speakers to certify under penalty of perjury that the required 
disclosures have been made, and (d) extending disclosure beyond express 
advocacy and electioneering communications, to reach other communications 
that may influence elections.46  
 
 38. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-82 (1992). 
 39. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
 40. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010). 
 41. Nat’l Inst. for Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370, 2378 (2018). 
 42. Id. at 2374–78 (2018). See Daniel P. Tokaji, Denying Systemic Equality: The Last Words 
of the Kennedy Court, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 539, 561–65 (2019). 
 43. Hasen, supra note 10, at 553. 
 44. For an exploration of this thorny problem, see Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The 
People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602 (2018). 
 45. Hasen, supra note 10, at 556. 
 46. Id. at 557–62.  There have been proposals in Congress for legislation that would strengthen 
disclosure for online political advertisements, such as the so-called “Honest Ads Act,” S. 1356 
(May 7, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1356/text [https://perma. 
cc/S2RK-DQNM]. 
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The last of these recommendations presents the most novel—and 
constitutionally uncertain—recommendation, since it would reach beyond 
communications that are covered by current federal law and would inevitably 
reach some expression that is not intended to influence elections. The difficulty 
is navigating between the twin shoals of overbreadth and vagueness. Under 
current law, Congress can require disclosure of spending that is not intended to 
influence elections, but to achieve other ends such as influencing 
policymaking.47 But Professor Hasen has good reason for worrying that the 
Roberts Court will take a more skeptical view of disclosure requirements that 
reach beyond campaign spending and contributions.48 And even if the Court 
were to uphold an enhanced disclosure requirement, there is reason to doubt how 
much it would really accomplish. No matter how inclusive the disclosure and 
certification requirements are, they are subject to evasion.49 Moreover, 
disclosure alone cannot achieve the democracy-enhancing goals of campaign 
finance reform; without more, it is an excuse for abandoning those goals.50  
To Professor Hasen’s list of proposed law reform, I would add one more:  
5. Restrict election interference by foreign governments. The risk and reality 
of foreign governments and their agents spreading misinformation justifies 
stricter limits on their federal campaign contributions and expenditures than 
current federal law provides. Longstanding federal law prohibits any “foreign 
national” from making contributions and expenditures to influence federal 
elections.51 This statute dates back to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938 (FARA), and amendments adopted in 1966 to prevent foreign interests 
from influencing American elections.52 It defines “foreign national” broadly, to 
include not just agents of a foreign government but any individual who is not a 
U.S. citizen, national, or permanent resident.53 The law imposes the same rule 
 
 47. Hasen, supra note 10, at 561. The leading Supreme Court case, as he notes, is United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (upholding lobbying disclosure requirements of Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act). See also Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (upholding disclosure requirements of Lobbying Disclosure Act). 
 48. Hasen, supra note 10, at 562. 
 49. Professor Hasen acknowledges this point. Id. at 563. 
 50. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 290 (2009); 
see also id. at 276 (“disclosure is not likely to accomplish much in directly making the financing 
of elections more democratic”). 
 51. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012). 
 52. Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign 
Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 508–09 (1997). See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, 
Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (1989). 
 53. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (defining foreign national to include “foreign principal,” as well as 
individuals who are not U.S. citizens, nationals, or permanent residents); 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) 
(defining “foreign principal” to include foreign governments and corporations). 
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on foreign governments and foreign individuals,54 prohibiting them from 
making contributions and expenditures in federal elections.55  
In Bluman v. Federal Election Commission,56 a three-judge district court 
panel gave this provision a narrow construction in order to save it from a First 
Amendment challenge. The opinion by then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh (affirmed 
without opinion by the Supreme Court) held that the statute “does not restrain 
foreign nationals from speaking out about issues or spending money to advocate 
their views about issues.”57 It interpreted the statute to reach only “a certain form 
of expressive activity closely tied to the voting process—providing money for a 
candidate or political party or spending money in order to expressly advocate 
for or against the election of a candidate.”58  
By its terms, Bluman’s interpretation narrows the foreign interference 
statute in two significant respects, both of them flatly inconsistent with the 
statutory text. First, Bluman limits the contribution ban to monetary 
contributions, thus seeming to exclude in-kind (i.e., nonmonetary) contributions. 
Thus, according to Bluman, the statute would not prohibit a foreign government 
from providing valuable information—such as polling data or dirt on an 
opponent—to a federal candidate or political party, even if that information has 
a determinate monetary value.59 This interpretation flatly contradicts the 
statutory text,60 creating a potential loophole in the statute.61 Second, Bluman 
limits the expenditure ban to express advocacy,62 even though the statute’s plain 
 
 54. For purposes of this discussion, I use the term “foreign individuals” to mean individuals 
who are not U.S. citizens, nationals, or permanent residents. 
 55. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012). 
 56. Bluman v. Federal Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 57. Id. at 290. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Daniel P. Tokaji, What Trump Jr. Did Was Bad, But It Probably Didn’t Violate 
Federal Campaign Finance Law, JUST SECURITY BLOG (June 14, 2017), https://www.justsecurity 
.org/43116/trump-jr-bad-didnt-violate-federal-campaign-finance-law/ [https://perma.cc/U944-D2 
ZX]. 
 60. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A) (2012). 
 61. Id. The report of Special Counsel Robert Mueller on Russian interference in the 2016 
election considered a potential violation of the foreign contribution ban through in-kind 
contributions, in connection with a meeting at Trump Tower between Donald Trump, Jr. and 
Russian representatives. Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian 
Interference in The 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. I, at 184–88 (2019), https://www.justice. 
gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/58LZ-RBLW]. The report concluded (contrary to what 
Bluman implies) that the statute should be read to cover in-kind contributions like opposition 
research, though noted that there was some legal uncertainty over the question. Id. at 187. 
 62. See also Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (“This statute, as we interpret it, does not bar 
foreign nationals from issue advocacy—that is, speech that does not expressly advocate the election 
or defeat of a specific candidate.”); id. at 288 (“the question here is whether . . . express-advocacy 
expenditures . . . constitute part of the process of democratic self-government”). 
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language includes disbursements for electioneering communications as well.63 
Federal law defines electioneering communications to include broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communications mentioning a specific federal candidate, within 
thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election, targeted to the 
relevant electorate.64 That means that a foreign government could spend money 
on a TV ad attacking a federal candidate within these time frames, so long as it 
avoids “magic words” such as “vote for” or “vote against.”  
Bluman’s narrowing interpretation of the existing statute seems to have been 
driven by concern that a broader interpretation would have a potentially 
unconstitutional effect on the speech of foreign individuals.65 But these concerns 
carry less force for attempted interference in U.S. elections by foreign 
governments or their agents.66 Although existing federal law treats foreign 
governments and foreign individuals identically, there is strong justification for 
a more stringent ban on the former than the latter.  
We now have substantial evidence of extensive foreign governmental 
interference with our elections.67 The most significant example, of course, is the 
Russian government’s vicious campaign of disinformation during the 2016 
election campaign, which reached hundreds of millions68 and is extensively 
documented in a recent report of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee that 
received rare bipartisan support.69 This report documents how the “Russian 
information warfare campaign” used falsified social media accounts to animate 
people on opposing sides of “socially divisive issues—such as race, 
immigration, and Second Amendment rights—in an attempt to pit Americans 
against one another and against their government.”70 The report found that no 
group was more heavily targeted than African Americans, with phony social 
media accounts like “Blacktivist” used to generate millions of contacts.71 This 
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 64. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (2012). 
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is just one example of how foreign governments employ false and misleading 
information to exacerbate existing racial and political divisions. Not all of it was 
lies, or even untruthful. Some of the information that Russia helped spread was 
true, even though the sources were indifferent to the truth and misrepresented 
their motives. In other words, some of it was bullshit rather than lies. Although 
Russia is the worst documented governmental offender to date, it is not the only 
one about which we need worry.72  
There is good reason for expanding existing law to cover online 
communications by foreign governments and their agents.73 Whatever the scope 
of First Amendment protections enjoyed by individuals who are not U.S. 
citizens, nationals, or permanent residents, those of foreign governments and 
their agents are considerably less.74 Congress could certainly act to prohibit 
foreign governments from making any contributions to candidates, parties, or 
political committees, including in-kind contributions that lack a determinate 
monetary value. Congress could also reduce the dollar threshold for criminal 
prosecution ($2000) or felony punishment ($25,000).75 
Foreign government expenditures for online electioneering present a more 
difficult regulatory challenge. Because the existing electioneering ban only 
reaches broadcast, cable, and satellite communications, it does not prohibit 
foreign governments from spending money for online communications, so long 
as they avoid express advocacy. Congress could limit expenditures for online 
electioneering communications by foreign governments and their agents. Such 
a limit could borrow the thirty/sixty day timeframes from the existing definition 
of “electioneering communications,” while expanding the ban to reach all such 
communications—including those distributed through social media and other 
online sources—funded by foreign governments, over a prescribed monetary 
threshold.  
To be sure, there are legitimate concerns about expanding the restriction on 
foreign government expenditures to reach online electioneering. Unlike 
broadcast, cable, and satellite communications, social media and other online 
communications are not limited (and not necessarily targeted) to any particular 
 
 72. See Tim Mak, Experts Warn U.S. Should Prepare For Election Interference From China, 
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 73. Federal law also contains a definition for “agents of a foreign principal,” including foreign 
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 74. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987) (upholding FARA’s registration 
requirement for those distributing films and periodicals funded by foreign governments); Ronald J. 
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market. Thus, a restriction on online electioneering by foreign governments 
cannot practically be limited geographically, in the way the existing 
electioneering ban is. Moreover, foreign governments can scarcely be expected 
to avoid mentioning candidates for federal office, some of whom will be current 
officeholders, within thirty or sixty days of an election. So any restriction on 
online speech would have to be limited to paid ads, or set a maximum dollar 
threshold on foreign government expenditures for other speech. This would 
make enforcement especially challenging, given the difficulty of ascertaining 
exactly how much foreign governments are spending to influence domestic 
elections. Still, a limitation on foreign government electioneering could help 
stem the tide of false and misleading speech from foreign governments aimed at 
destabilizing American democracy, which is otherwise likely to crash upon our 
shores with increasing force and regularity in years to come.  
B. Electoral Institutions 
As is true of the electoral reforms that Professor Hasen advocates, restricting 
foreign government misinformation can only do so much. The greatest threats 
to our political discourse come not from the outside, but from within. On this 
front, election law scholars would do best to shift their attention from electoral 
rules to the institutions responsible for election administration and adjudication.  
Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg have offered an immensely valuable 
framework for understanding the risk of democratic backsliding, concluding that 
the United States is at greater risk than has commonly been supposed.76 They 
begin by identifying three intertwined characteristics that are essential to 
constitutional democracy: (1) competitive elections, (2) free speech and 
association, and (3) administrative and adjudicative rule of law.77 They proceed 
to contrast two different pathways through which constitutional democracy can 
fail. One is through the rapid collapse, which they call “authoritarian 
reversion.”78 The other is through a slow-motion deterioration in the three 
institutional prerequisites for a well-functioning constitutional democracy, 
which they call “constitutional regression.”79 Their central argument is that the 
United States is at much greater risk of a gradual deterioration of constitutional 
democracy than an immediate collapse into authoritarianism. They also note that 
one of the risk factors is the widening economic inequality that the U.S. has 
experienced.80 For more than four decades, income and wealth disparities have 
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increased alongside political polarization.81 There is good reason to believe that 
the centrifugal forces of economic inequality and political polarization are 
mutually reinforcing, for reasons that are not completely understood.82 For 
present purposes, the key point is that the widening gulf between rich and poor—
which partly reflects inequalities of political influence—exacerbates the risk of 
democratic deterioration.  
All this means that election law cannot solve all the challenges that 
American democracy faces. But it can do something more than Professor Hasen 
suggests. He concludes his article by suggesting that election scholars focus on 
how election laws and procedures should be updated “to assure continued 
peaceful transitions of power.”83 While this line of research is important,84 
intervention only at this late stage in the process is like trying to close the barn 
door after the horses have bolted. An immediate reversion to autocracy is not the 
main threat confronting democracy in America. As Huq and Ginsburg explain, 
the gradual retrogression arising is a far more realistic and insidious threat. And 
protecting our institutions—especially those with electoral responsibilities—is 
an essential means by which to stem that retrogression.85 
In the sphere of election law, the most promising remedy is to improve the 
functioning of the bodies that are responsible for administering our elections. 
The U.S. remains an outlier among democratic countries, in the degree to which 
elections are run by partisan actors.86 In most states, the chief election official 
(usually the Secretary of State) is elected to office as the nominee of one of the 
political parties. And we have seen repeated instances in which state and local 
election officials execute their responsibilities in a manner that favors their own 
party. The actions of Georgia’s Brian Kemp—who in his capacity as Secretary 
of State made numerous controversial decisions that aided his own successful 
campaign for Governor87—is just the latest and perhaps most egregious 
example.  
 
 81. Tokaji, supra note 16, at 771. 
 82. Id. at 771–73. 
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AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2020).  I agree, though I see greater risks in the 
more gradual deterioration arising from rising political polarization and economic inequality. Dan 
Tokaji, The Centrifugal Forces of Democracy, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 28, 2020). 
 84. For a worthy example, see EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES 8–9 (2016). 
 85. See SNYDER, supra note 4, at 22 (explaining why it is essential to protect institutions). 
 86. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Comparative Election Administration: A Legal Perspective on 
Electoral Institutions, COMPARATIVE ELECTION LAW (forthcoming 2020). 
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On this front, the U.S. could learn much from the experience of other 
countries. There is now a rich body of literature on the functioning of election 
management bodies around the globe.88 While most of that literature emphasizes 
the independence of election management bodies, the empirical research 
suggests that functional impartiality is much more important.89 That impartiality 
is often advanced by allowing for representation and interaction among disparate 
political factions within the election management body, rather than by 
attempting to completely insulate that body from partisan politics.90 Heather 
Gerken has referred to this idea as the inoculation of electoral bodies with 
politics, so that disputes can be channeled through them. At the state level, the 
U.S. lacks independent election authorities, with its lone exemplar—
Wisconsin’s Government Accountability Board91—been abolished by the state 
legislature in 2015.92 Given the difficulty of establishing independent election 
management bodies in the U.S., election law scholars should consider how 
institutions might be restructured so as to allow representation by both major 
parties. One possibility is a bipartisan model of state election administration, 
which would allow partisan conflict to be more effectively channeled than in the 
current system, where one major party or the other effectively controls the 
administration of elections in most states.  
Finally, in an era of proliferating falsehoods, it is incumbent on the judiciary 
to defend the truth. Over the past two decades, the courts—federal courts in 
particular—have played an increasingly important role in overseeing elections, 
and especially in enforcing federal voting rights. Some of those cases have 
involved constitutional claims, others claims under statutes like the Voting 
Rights Act. Plaintiffs have not always succeeded in stopping practices alleged 
to impose illegal burdens on voting, like voter ID laws, registration purges, and 
restrictions on early voting. But some of these cases have succeeded, thereby 
stopping some of the most egregious restrictions on democratic participation.93 
The facts matter in these kinds of cases, particularly under the balancing 
standard that the Court has suggested.94 In general, federal courts have done a 
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good job of scrutinizing the evidentiary record to discern both the effects on 
voters and the rationale underlying the state’s action.95 
On the whole, then, the federal courts have played a constructive role in 
overseeing election administration since 2000. Will that constructive 
engagement continue? Professor Hasen worries about “siloed justices,” the risk 
that members of the Supreme Court will increasingly have divergent views of 
the facts corresponding to the partisan orientation of the news sources they 
consume96—with the more liberal justices getting their truth from the New York 
Times and NPR, the more conservative justices from the Wall Street Journal and 
Fox news. My colleague Katrina Lee has raised a similar concern about the 
impact of social media, worrying that their interaction with bots and bubbles will 
compromise judicial impartiality.97 These concerns are real. At the same time, 
the judiciary has an advantage over the so-called political branches of 
government: they must justify their decisions based on evidence and reason. At 
the heart of the legal method is the idea that courts should make findings of facts 
based on the evidence presented, and then apply the law to those facts. Of course, 
there are often legitimate disagreements about what the facts are, just as there 
are over how the law should be interpreted and applied. But the mode of analysis 
in which courts engage does provide them with a functional advantage over 
political actors—up to and including the President—who may play fast and 
loose with the facts. The legal method may not guarantee truth, but it does 
provide a hedge against the most egregious falsehoods.98  
III.  SPEECH LAW IS INCREASINGLY AT ODDS WITH THE TRUTH AND 
DEMOCRACY VALUES TO WHICH IT ASPIRES 
Having explored what election law might do to stem the rising tide of 
bullshit and lies, I now turn to the law governing freedom of speech. Professor 
Hasen’s essay mostly takes existing First Amendment doctrine as a given, noting 
at several points the severe constraints that it imposes upon public entities’ 
authority to combat false expression.99 Most significant among these limitations, 
the First Amendment has long been understood to limit government’s power to 
discriminate against speech based upon its content.100 The Roberts Court has 
doubled down on this principle in recent years, applying strict scrutiny to 
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content-discriminatory laws, outside a handful of established areas where speech 
is less protected (like obscenity, defamation, fighting words, threats, and 
bribery).101 As the definition of speech has broadened and the rule against 
content discrimination hardened, a disconnect between free speech theory and 
doctrine has emerged. The result is that free speech doctrine is not delivering on 
its promise to promote truth and democratic self-government. That doesn’t mean 
existing doctrine should be abandoned, but we should think more carefully about 
further expansion and consider other ways in which these intertwined values 
might be vindicated.  
Let me start by stating my belief in the vision of free speech underlying 
modern First Amendment law. That vision is best captured by Justice William 
Brennan’s opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan: “[W]e consider this case 
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks 
on government and public officials.”102 At the core of this vision is idea that 
“uninhibited” speech is a good thing.103  
But toward what end? At this point, conventional understandings of the First 
Amendment diverge. The three leading theories of free speech emphasize 
different fundamental values:  
 1. Autonomy. The first theory sees individual fulfillment as the primary 
goal of the First Amendment. As Justice Thurgood Marshall put it, free speech 
“serves the needs of . . . the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.”104 This perspective on freedom of speech tends toward a negative 
libertarian perspective, the idea that the government best promotes individual 
liberty by avoiding any constraints on speech, whatever its content.105  
 2. Democracy. The second theory emphasizes democratic self-
government as the main purpose of free speech. Associated with the work of 
Alexander Meiklejohn, this theory emphasizes the centrality of a rich political 
discourse to a well-functioning democracy.106 If we are not free to debate issues 
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of public importance, the theory goes, then democracy will ultimately give way 
to tyranny.107 The above quotation of Justice Brennan tends toward the 
democracy theory. It suggests that the advantage of an “uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open” public debate is to allow criticism of those in power, thus clearing 
the channel for political change.108 
 3. Truth. The third theory holds that freedom of speech promotes the 
search for truth. This theory is associated with the “marketplace of ideas” 
metaphor, articulated over a century ago in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States:  
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe … that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market.109 
The roots of this theory can be traced even deeper, to Thomas Jefferson110 and 
even John Milton.111 The idea is that truth will ultimately rise to the top, if the 
free exchange of competing ideas prevails.  
Today, the democracy theory of free speech holds sway among judges and 
commentators across the ideological spectrum, as autonomy and truth have 
faded into the background.112 The Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 
for example, rests on the premise that freedom of speech is essential to 
democracy.113 No conception of individual freedom justifies the notion that 
corporate speech is protected by the First Amendment, as has been the law for 
more than four decades.114 And there are deeper problems with autonomy 
theory. It has no persuasive answer to Robert Bork’s devastating critique, which 
questioned why expression should be preferred to other human activities through 
which people might find fulfillment, like stock trading, bartending, or sexual 
intercourse.115  
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As for truth theory, the “marketplace” metaphor has long fallen into 
disrepute among scholars, for its seeming presumption that truth will necessarily 
emerge from an unregulated market.116 And there are good reasons for doubting 
that less regulation will actually promote truth, especially in the short term.117 I 
count myself among those who doubt that truth will inexorably emerge from an 
unregulated marketplace of ideas. That should not cause us to abandon the idea 
that promoting truth is at the core of the First Amendment’s purpose.118  It 
should, however, cause us to question whether a laissez-faire approach will 
advance truth.   
What we have lost over the decades is a recognition of the deep connection 
between truth and democracy. It wasn’t always so. Justice Holmes’s dissenting 
opinion in Abrams is typically understood as embodying the truth theory, but it 
is also grounded in a recognition that democratic self-government depends on 
making room for political opposition: “Persecution for the expression of 
opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises 
or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express 
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”119  
The idea that truth and democracy are inextricably linked is even more 
explicit in the Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.120 
Some eight years after joining Justice Holmes’s Abrams dissent, Justice 
Brandeis famously wrote: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to 
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as 
an end and as a means. They believed liberty to the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you 
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would 
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection 
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this 
should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They 
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew 
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that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; 
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; 
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels 
is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion, they eschewed silence—coerced by law—the argument of force in 
its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, 
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be 
guaranteed.121 
For both Justices Holmes and Brandeis, then, truth and democracy were joined 
at the hip. Freedom of speech was meant to promote “political truth,” and 
thereby ward off the threat of tyranny. 
It’s unfortunate that the truth and democracy theories of free speech were 
decoupled over time. As consensus has developed around democratic self-
government as the main justification for protecting speech, we have lost sight of 
the fact that democracy and truth are intertwined.122 There are very good reasons 
for the centrality of democracy in contemporary free speech doctrine, including 
its better fit with freedoms of the press and association.123 But there are costs to 
this approach, most notably the failure to recognize—as Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis did—that democracy depends upon a commitment to truth.124 One can 
believe that the search for truth and the protection of democracy are linked, as 
they did, while rejecting the empirically doubtful proposition that an unregulated 
marketplace of ideas will necessarily advance either value.125 
This highlights a perverse feature of contemporary speech doctrine. Despite 
its nominal commitment to democratic self-government as the central rationale 
for constitutionally privileging speech, the doctrine still embraces a negative 
libertarian approach to speech. That orientation has been especially notable 
under the Roberts Court, which has defined speech broadly—to cover, for 
example, violent video games126 and depictions of animal cruelty127—while 
adopting a strong presumption that any restraints on covered speech are 
forbidden.128 In previous generations, by contrast, the Supreme Court was more 
willing to find certain categories of non-political speech (like obscenity and 
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commercial speech) to be of “low value,” and therefore entitled to lesser First 
Amendment protection.129 
Ashutosh Bhagwat persuasively explained how contemporary First 
Amendment doctrine is at odds with the democracy theory of speech. That is 
especially true of the principle of content neutrality, which the Roberts Court 
has broadened and hardened.130 A striking example is Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
an otherwise forgettable case invalidating a municipal sign ordinance.131 The 
ordinance imposed different rules on signage depending on their content. For 
example, temporary directional signs were subject to more stringent restrictions 
than others, including those containing ideological messages which were treated 
most favorably.132 The Court was unanimous in finding the ordinance content-
discriminatory and in the bottom-line conclusion that the ordinance should be 
struck down.133 But there was sharp disagreement on the strength of the 
presumption against content discrimination. Justice Thomas’s opinion stated, in 
more absolute terms than the Court ever has, that content-discriminatory laws 
are presumptively unconstitutional: “A law that is content based on its face is 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-
neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the 
regulated speech.”134 The concurring justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan) 
would have adopted a less absolute presumption against constitutionality.135  
The majority’s fixation on content-discrimination is hard to reconcile with 
the democracy theory of speech—especially when considering a law that treats 
political speech more favorably than other speech.136 As Justice Kagan notes in 
her concurring opinion, this hard presumption is also irreconcilable with truth 
theory.137 It’s hard to see how the discovery of truth is impeded by treating 
directional signs less favorably than political signs. 
Reed is emblematic of the disjunction between free speech theory and 
contemporary doctrine. In its mechanical invocation and application of the 
general principle that content discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny, the 
Court has lost sight of why content discrimination should be viewed as 
problematic. The best answer is that it is a prophylactic, aimed at preventing 
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viewpoint discrimination, especially in the realm of democratic politics.138 
Despite the ascendancy of democracy theory among commentators and courts, 
contemporary doctrine has increasingly moved toward a broader definition of 
speech and a stiffening of the bar against content discrimination that cannot be 
justified by the interest in promoting democratic self-government. Nor can it be 
justified by an interest in promoting the search for truth. Rather, the negative 
libertarian features of current doctrine are better explained by autonomy theory. 
The Court may preach fidelity to democratic self-government as its guiding 
principle, but its practice is more in line with the hands-off to speech favored by 
those advocating speech as a means of self-fulfillment. As I have elsewhere 
written, recent speech decisions like NIFLA v. Becerra139 and Janus v. 
AFSCME140 embrace a relentlessly atomistic approach that is at war with the 
interest in systemic equality essential to democratic self-government.141 Though 
ostensibly grounded in concerns about content discrimination, they actually 
embed systematic viewpoint discrimination—favoring one side of contentious 
public issues while disfavoring the other—into First Amendment law.142 
It should therefore come as no surprise that the atomistic approach that 
dominates First Amendment doctrine—including its broadening definition of 
speech and stiffening prohibition on content discrimination—is advancing 
neither the discovery of truth nor the flourishing of democracy. The concerns 
that animate Professor Hasen’s lecture are thus part of a larger problem with 
contemporary free speech law, exemplifying the failure of the libertarian 
approach to speech. As he and others have observed, the costs of producing 
speech are lower than ever.143 One can easily start a Twitter or Instagram 
account, and use it to broadcast words and images to the world at little or no 
cost. Those who are famous, or especially skilled at messaging, can generate 
thousands of views in a matter of seconds, and millions of followers over time. 
Though speech can be more cheaply disseminated than ever, no one can 
seriously pretend we have a healthy political discourse. Most distressingly, we 
have seen a dramatic increase in demonstrably false speech—bullshit and lies—
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with traumatic effects on democratic discourse.144 Recall the vision of robust 
public debate that Justice Brennan articulated in New York Times v. Sullivan. A 
premise of both truth and democracy theory is that we will actually be talking to 
one another, sharing ideas with people who see the world differently—not just 
trolling them—and that we will be open to persuasion. But that is not our world. 
It is not just the justices of the Supreme Court who are siloed. Most of us live 
our lives in silos, red and blue, interacting mostly with people who share our 
ideological views, with very few places where we can interact with and have 
reasonable conversations with those on the other side.145  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that social media, deep fakes, bots, and 
other technologies are responsible for proliferation of bullshit and lies, or the 
attendant deterioration of democratic discourse. Political polarization, among 
both politicians and the people, has been on the rise for decades, and appears to 
be linked to the rise in economic inequality.146 But the cheapening of speech, 
combined with the negative libertarian presumptions that dominate 
contemporary speech doctrine, certainly aren’t helping. To the contrary, they are 
contributing to an unhealthy political discourse that advances neither truth nor 
democracy.  
What can be done about all of this? It is surely asking too much of First 
Amendment doctrine to fix the problem of spiraling falsehoods.147 But we can 
at least try to bridge the growing divide between that doctrine and its truth and 
democracy-promoting aspirations. Arguing that free speech doctrine is “on a 
collision course with reality,” Professor Bhagwat makes two suggestions: first, 
that decisions about whether expression is covered by the First Amendment be 
guided by the concern with democratic self-governance;148 and second, that the 
blanket prohibition on content discrimination be reconsidered in contexts where 
it does not advance that interest.149 Though we should be careful about 
abandoning doctrines that have generally served our democracy well for many 
decades, there is also reason for caution on the other side. We should be equally 
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careful about an ever-expanding definition of speech and increasingly 
doctrinaire application of the content-neutrality principle, in contexts where they 
do not advance the interests in promotion truth and democracy. Another path, 
suggested by Tabatha Abu El-Haj, is to consider how intermediary groups—
including civil associations, labor unions, and political parties—might be 
strengthened so as to promote a more healthy engagement in democracy.150 This 
line of inquiry is especially promising and worthy of deeper exploration.  
Professor Hasen has done us all a service by shedding light on how 
technological innovation has contributed to the impoverishment of democratic 
discourse. Distressing as those developments are, they allow us the opportunity 
to consider the lost linkage between the truth and democracy theories of free 
speech. Although these have long been viewed as distinct, the reality is that 
democracy cannot function without a shared commitment to truth. The 
prevalence of public falsehood—the ease with which it is disseminated and the 
difficulty of checking it—should be seen as a First Amendment problem, which 
existing doctrine does not adequately address. To be sure, we cannot expect 
constitutional law to save us from the explosion of lies and bullshit that Professor 
Hasen and others have documented. The most we can reasonably expect from 
speech doctrine is that it be better aligned with the promotion of truth and 
advancement of democratic self-government. The remaining question, to which 
I now turn, is what we as teachers and scholars can do to advance those ends.  
IV.  STOP TALKING ABOUT THE “POST-TRUTH” WORLD 
This brings me to my most significant disagreement with Professor Hasen: 
his repeated reference to the “post-truth” world. I respectfully urge that we all 
avoid this language. That is not because I disagree with either of his diagnosis 
of the problem or his prescribed solutions. It is rather because to say that we are 
in a “post-truth” world concedes—or at least appears to concede—that 
agreement on truth is no longer possible. If we concede that point, then the liars 
and bullshitters win.  
Two short non-law books are helpful in understanding why it is so harmful 
to speak of the “post-truth” world, as though it were a thing. I have already 
summarized the distinction that Professor Frankfurt’s On Bullshit draws 
between lies and bullshit, the former characterized by knowledge of the truth 
and intent to deceive on what it is, the latter by a reckless disregard for truth. As 
Frankfurt explains, “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”151 
While the liar knows the truth and tries to deceive his audience about it, the 
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bullshitter simply does not care. In Frankfurt’s words, “his intention is neither 
to report the truth nor to conceal it.”152 The distinction is thus one of motivation. 
For the bullshitter, it is not to fool people about what the truth is, but something 
else—winning votes, making money, or changing the listener’s perception of 
him.  
That is why commentator Matthew Yglesias’s reference to President Trump 
as the “Bullshitter-in-Chief” is so manifestly appropriate.153 Although the 
President often lies, he more often bullshits, oblivious to whether what he says 
is true or false. Yet there is a method to his mendacity.  As my colleague Ruth 
Colker has observed, President Trump frequently slings false and insulting 
statements at his political opponents.154  The aim isn’t so much to deceive as to 
demean others, while aggrandizing himself. 
Bullshit, especially when it comes from the mouth of the President, is 
poisonous to democracy.  That is a key lesson from another short book, historian 
Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. 
Drawing on his study of failed democracies of the past, Professor Snyder 
cautions Americans against complacency in the face of public dishonesty. 
Among the lessons of the last century is that it is essential to insist upon truth, 
especially on the part of our elected leaders: “To abandon facts is to abandon 
freedom. If nothing is true, then no one can criticize power, because there is no 
basis upon which to do so. If nothing is true, then all is spectacle.”155 
Irreverence for truth spreads like dysentery. In the present moment, it is not 
merely the President and his press secretaries who evince a disregard for facts. 
It can filter throughout the government and beyond. Take the recent Supreme 
Court case challenging the addition of a citizenship question to the U.S. 
Census.156 Throughout that litigation, the Department of Commerce and its head 
Wilbur Ross repeatedly misrepresented what they were up to. They falsely 
claimed that the reason for adding this question to the census was to facilitate 
enforcement of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I doubt whether anyone 
seriously believed this explanation.  It was a lie, and such an obvious one that 
Chief Justice Roberts—joined by the more liberal members of the Court—could 
not overlook it. As the majority politely put it: “We are presented, in other 
words, with an explanation for agency action that is incongruent with what the 
record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decision-making process.”157 
While the opinion does not disclose the real reason for adding the question, it 
was common knowledge by the time it was issued. After the case was briefed 
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and argued but before the opinion was released, a treasure trove of documents 
from the hard drive of a deceased Republican operative showed that the main 
reason for adding the question was to influence the 2020 redistricting process.158 
Adding the citizenship question would depress participation among Latinos and 
noncitizens, and thus would be “advantageous to Republicans and Non-Hispanic 
Whites.”159 Fortunately, the Court called Secretary Ross and the government out 
on their lie, euphemistically referring to their explanation as “contrived” and “a 
distraction.”160 Even in the age of Trump, courts may still serve as a bulwark of 
truth.161   
My namesake Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said: “Everyone is entitled to 
his own opinion, but not to his own facts.”162 Yet that is the world in which we 
increasingly live. And that is why we must resist the temptation to speak of the 
“post-truth” world. To accept that it is no longer possible for us to reach 
agreement on truth is to concede democracy to its adversaries. In Snyder’s 
words, “Post-truth is pre-fascism.”163  
I know that Professor Hasen agrees with all this. We both believe that it is 
essential for us to insist upon truth, even—and especially—in a world where we 
have such fierce disagreements about what is and what should be. In that sense, 
our disagreement is semantic—it is about the words we use to describe our 
present political condition. But to call our disagreement semantic is not to say it 
is unimportant. For the words we use matter. To speak of our world as “post-
truth” is to concede that we are beyond the possibility of truth, to give up on our 
electoral institutions, our courts, and our collective capacity to see beyond the 
lies and bullshit. If we surrender that fight, then Donald Trump, Vladamir Putin, 
the bots, and the trolls have won. And then, truly, democracy is lost.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In an era when bullshit is pervasive, there is a strong temptation to give up. 
We may despair of reaching agreement on what is true and believe that law no 
longer matters. To indulge such fears would be wrong. Election and speech law 
cannot fix all the problems that ail our democracy, but they can help. Professor 
Hasen has made some valuable suggestions on how electoral rules might be 
modified to promote truth and counter lies and bullshit. To those, I would add 
improvement of our electoral institutions and our courts, which play an essential 
role in ensuring other governmental actors’ fidelity to truth. As Professor Snyder 
puts it: “It is institutions that help us to preserve our decency. They need our 
help as well.”164 We should also consider how speech law might be improved, 
to better meet its aspirations of advancing truth and democratic self-government. 
Lastly, we must not accept that our world is “post-truth.” Instead we must double 
down on truth, as though democracy depends upon it. Because it does. 
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